One Man, One Vote and Selection of Delegates
to National Nominating Conventions
After eight years of decisions and copious commentary, the impact
of the reapportionment cases on political parties remains unclear.
Whether the one man, one vote standard developed by the Court
since Baker v. Carr1 should be imposed on political parties is a question that has arisen most pointedly in regard to selection of delegates
to national nominating conventions. 2
The argument for imposing the criterion of one man, one vote-or
more precisely, one party member, one vote-on delegate selection can
be briefly summarized.3 The reapportionment cases hold that dilution
of voting power is a denial of equal protection under the fourteenth
amendment and a violation of the right to vote.4 Districting schemes
1 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The decisions spawned by Baker include: Hadley v. Junior College District, 90 S. Ct. 791 (1970); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969); Wells v.
Rockefeller, 594 U.S. 542 (1969); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); Dusch v.
Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967); Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967); Swann v. Adams,
385 U.S. 440 (1967); Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231 (1966); Burns v. Richardson, 384 US.
73 (1966); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 877 U.S. 713 (1964); Roman v.
Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 US. 678 (1964); Maryland Comm. for
Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 877 U.S. 633
(1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 877 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Gray
v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963). The most complete discussion of the one man, one vote
problem yet to appear is R. DIXON, DFAtOcRATic REPREsENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN
LAW AND POLITICS (1968). See also G. BAKER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION (1966).
2 See Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, 287 F. Supp. 794 (D. Minn.), afJ'd per
curiam, 399 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1968); Smith v. State Executive Comm., 288 F. Supp. 371
(N.D. Ga. 1968); Dahl v. Republican State Comm., Civil No. 7557 (W.D. Wash. 1968),
vacated and remanded, 393 U.S. 408 (1969). In other cases, the question has arisen in
regard to elections to choose party committee members. Lynch v. Torquato, 843 F.2d 370
(3d Cir. 1965); Rogers v. State Comm. of the Republican Party, 96 N.J. Super. 265, 232
A.2d 852 (1967); Davis v. Sullivan, 47 Misc. 2d 60, 261 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1965).
3 The argument, or a variant thereof, is made in: Comment, Constitutional Reform of
State Delegate Selection to National Political Party Conventions, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 915
(1970); Note, ConstitutionalSafeguards in the Selection of Delegates to PresidentialNominating Conventions, 78 YALE L.J. 1228 (1969); Note, The PresidentialNomination: Equal
Protection at the Grass Roots, 42 S. CAL. L. REv. 169 (1969); Note, Regulation of Political
Parties: Vote Dilution in the Presidential Nomination Procedure, 54 IowA L. REV. 471
(1968); Hungry Democrats, THE Nmv REPuBLIC, Sept. 27, 1969, at 12; cf. testimony of Dean
Louis Pollak of Yale University Law School speaking on behalf of Connecticut challengers
before the Credentials Committee at the 1968 Democratic National Convention, CONG.
QuAR. SERVICE, THE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING CONVENTIONS 1968, at 103 (1968).
4 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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which vary from the principle of numerical equality are invalid as a
dilution of the voting power of those who live in more populous districts.5 Neither major party chooses its national convention delegates
in accordance with the mathematically precise standards of the reapportionment cases, 6 with the result that some of those participating in
the delegate selection process are underrepresented at this stage of the
nomination process. Since nomination is an integral part of the presidential election process, these inequalities dilute the vote for the
presidency itself. To avoid this alleged discrimination in voting power,
the constitutional principles applicable to other electoral processes are
similarly applicable to delegate selection. The application of these
principles, it is concluded, would secure effective popular control of
the presidential nominating process.
When pressed upon the courts this argument has so far been unsuccessful. 7 Despite efforts by the parties to "democratize" the delegate
selection process, 8 it is likely to be pressed again when a party's endorsement of a presidential candidate is once more at stake.
This comment takes the position that the one man, one vote formula
should continue to be rejected in the context of delegate selection for
three reasons. First, the fourteenth amendment's requirement of state
action and the requirement that a controversy be justiciable are less
easily satisfied with respect to delegate selection than with respect to
other aspects of the election process. Second, the national conventions
serve a role distinct from that of the governmental agencies with which
5 Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530-1 (1969), requires "a good faith effort to
achieve precise mathematical equality." See also Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969).
o Both major parties allow each state at least as many delegates as it has members of
Congress. Since senators are not assigned on a population basis, party members from
smaller states are "over-represented" by this method of allocating delegates. The two
national committee members of each state are also given delegate status. The distortion
is further increased by the allowance of "bonus votes" for success in previous elections.
For a more detailed analysis of deviation from mathematical equality in the allocation
of convention votes, see note 89 infra.
7 Cases cited note 2 supra.
8 In 1968, the Democrats adopted a resolution providing:
It is understood that a state Democratic party, in selecting and certifying delegates to the National Convention, thereby undertakes to assure that such delegates
have been selected through a process in which all Democratic voters have had full
and timely opportunity to participate. In determining whether a state party has
complied with this mandate, the convention shall require that:
(1) The unit rule not be used at any stage of the delegate selection process; and
(2) All feasible efforts have been made to assure that delegates are selected
through party primary, convention, or committee procedures open to public participation within the calendar year of the National Convention.
CONG. QUAR. SERVICE, THE PRSmENTIAL NOMINATING CONVENTIONS 1968, at 148, 197 (1968).
This resolution signals far reaching changes in selection of delegates in the Democratic
Party. For a description and analysis of these changes, see Schmidt & Whalen, Credentials
Contests at the 1968-And 1972-Democratic National Conventions, 82 HtARv. L. REv.
1438 (1969).
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the reapportionment cases have been concerned, and this creates a special set of problems not yet faced by the courts. Third, reforming the
delegate selection process by application of the one man, one vote
principle would hamper performance of the important functions the
national conventions now serve.
Analysis of each of these propositions is complicated by the two level
structure of delegate selection: first, the selection of national convention delegates by the state parties and, second, the apportionment of
delegates among the states by the national parties.9 Equal voting power
of party members in the overall delegate selection process could be
effected only by application of one man, one vote at both of these
levels. Because distinct problems arise at each level of delegate selection, these two levels will be considered separately in examining the
arguments for and against application of the one man, one vote standard
to selection of national convention delegates.
I.

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS: STATE AcrIoN AND THE
PoLITicAL QUESTION DOCTRINE

A. State Action

It is questionable whether there is much vitality left in the state
action limitation on application of the fourteenth amendment.1 0 Im12
precise and expansive notions of state involvement," state regulation,
and governmental or public functions 3 have been used to extend the
ambit of state action, without the corresponding development of a limiting concept. About all that can be said with certainty and accuracy
is that state action is circumscribed by very liberal borders. The expansion of the state action concept has been most striking in the context
of racial discrimination. 14 Indeed, some commentators feel that one
9 It should be noted that a state Democratic party may have more delegates than it
has convention votes. The Democrats permit fractional voting, although no delegate may
have less than one half vote. In the Republican convention each delegate casts one vote.
The textual references to allocation of delegates to the state parties by the national party
will assume that each delegate has one vote.
10 One authority calls state action "a conceptual disaster area." Black, The Supreme
Court-Foreword,81 HA~v. L. REv. 69, 95 (1967). See generally Developments in the Law
-Equal Protection, 82 HAmv. L. REv. 1065, 1069-72 (1969); Silard, A ConstitutionalForecast: Demise of the "State Action" Limit on the Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM.
L. REv. 855 (1966).
11 See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Shelley v. Kraemer,
34 U.S. 1 (1948).
12 cf. Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 843 U.S. 451 (1952).
13 See Evans v. Newton, 882 U.S. 296 (1966); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
-14 See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Au-

thority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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case involving a claim of racial discrimination in the conduct of a primary by a local political party may have read out this ingredient
altogether. 15 The White Primary Cases16 repeatedly found state action
in the conduct of primary elections and intervened to prohibit racial
discrimination.
There would seem to be little reason why this loose standard of state
action should be constricted when there is no claim of racial discrimi-

nation but the situation is otherwise factually similar. Thus, though
no claim of racial discrimination was made in Gray v. Sanders,17 the
Court had no difficulty in finding state action and applying one man,
one vote principles to invalidate use of the unit vote in a Georgia primary to select nominees for the United States Senate and other state-

wide offices. It might be further argued that the Court's finding of
state action in these primary cases was determined by the presence,

in each case, of a one-party system, where the party primary predetermined the general election victor.'" Such predetermination is absent
in the delegate selection situation. Without a more explicit indication

from the Court that predetermination of the general election is a significant factor in finding state action in primary elections, this factual
distinction would probably not frustrate a finding of state action in
the selection of national convention delegates through primary elections; for the degree of state involvement and regulation of one-party
state primaries is the same as that of delegate selection primaries. 19
15 The case is Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). Mr. Justice Harlan noted this in
his dissent in Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 320 n.5 (1966), citing Lewis, The Meaning
of State Action, 60 COLUm. L. REv. 1083, 1094 (1960) and Note, The Strange Career of
"State Action" Under the Fifteenth Amendment, 74 YALE L.J. 1448, 1456-9 (1965).
16 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v.
Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Baskin v. Brown, 174 F.2d 891 (4th Cir. 1949); Rice v.
Elmore, 165 F.2d 887 (4th Cir. 1947).
'7 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
18 It is difficult to assess exactly how much weight was accorded this factor. The Court
seems to rely on it heavily. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469 (1953), where Mr.
Justice Black pointed out that "[t]he Democratic primary and the general election have
become no more than the perfunctory ratifiers of the choice that has already been made
"; Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963); United States v.
in Jaybird elections ....
Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 313-4 (1941); Baskin v. Brown, 174 F.2d 391, 392 (4th Cir. 1949). On
the other hand, the Court points to other grounds for finding state action in primaries.
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663 (1944), indicates that primaries are conducted by the
party under state statutory authority and that this is grounds for designating the party
a state agency. Also, the Court's statement, for example, in Smith v. Allwright that "[w]hen
primaries become a part of the machinery for choosing officials, state and national, as
they have here, the same tests to determine the character of discrimination or abridgement
should be applied to the primary as are applied to the general election," would seem to
carry it beyond primaries in which predetermination is involved. Id. at 664.
19 In California, Florida, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio,
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In the majority of states, where parties choose delegates through state
conventions or executive committees, 20 the presence of state action is
not so clear. 21 Three lower federal courts have indicated that no state
action is involved in the conduct of intraparty affairs. In Lynch v.
Torquato,22 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit refused relief
to registered Democrats who alleged a denial of equal protection in the
selection of the members and chairman of a county Democratic committee. Two committee members were chosen from each precinct despite differences in the number of Democratic voters in each precinct.
The court said that "the normal role of party leaders in conducting internal affairs of their party.., does not make their party offices or the
filling of these offices state action .... "2
Lynch explicitly left open the question whether state action would
be present in a case in which a party officer is empowered to nominate
candidates for political office. 24 Four years later two other courts in
examining this question likewise indicated that the state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment had not been satisfied. In considering a challenge of malapportionment in the selection of Democratic
national convention delegates from Minnesota, the district court in
Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-LaborParty25 held that the alleged malapportionment was a "result of ... the constitution of the DFL as a

political party, not the by-product or result of any state statutes or state
constitutional provision," 26 even though state statutes recognized the
party and vested final authority over party affairs in the state convention.27 Similarly, Smith v. State Executive Committee28 held that in
Oregon, South Dakota, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia, all delegates are
chosen by primary. In Illinois, New York, and Pennsylvania only district delegates are
so chosen. Alabama Democrats select national convention delegates by primary. See U.S.
CONG. SEN. LIBRARY, NOMINATION AND ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES (1968).

20 In thirty-five states, all delegates are chosen by these party organs. Some states use
a hybrid system of selection. For example, New York parties choose congressional district
delegates at a primary while delegates at large are chosen by the party state committee or
state convention, as the rules of the party prescribe. N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 21. See also
ILL. RFv. STAT. ch. 46, §§ 7-1, 7-5, 7-9(b) (1967). A detailed statement of delegate selection
procedures is presented in U.S. CONC. SEN. LIBRARY, NOAIINATION AND ELECTION OF THE
PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1968).

21 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 378 n.10 (1963), states: "We do not here reach the
questions that would be presented were the convention system used for nominating candidates in lieu of the primary system."
22 343 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1965).
23 Id. at 372.
24 Id. at 373.
25 287 F. Supp. 794 (D. Minn.), aff'd per curiam, 399 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1968).
26 Id. at 801.
27 Id. at 798.

28 288 F. Supp. 371 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
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the selection of delegates to the Democratic National Convention, "No
action by the state is involved ... and no state officer is concerned. '29
To the extent that these decisions are accepted as authoritative considerations of state action, the anomalous result is that selection of
delegates will constitute state action in states which choose delegates at
primaries but not in states which choose delegates by other methods.
There is reason to believe, however, that Smith and Irish will be regarded as less than authoritative in their treatment of the state action
question. Neither court relied heavily on its state action findings, preferring to concentrate on other justifications for refusing to apply one
man, one vote to political parties.30 The perfunctory discussions of the
state action question in the two cases may have been due to a reluctance
to rest their decision on the conceptual quicksand of state action. The
question of state action in delegate selection can be approached more
systematically by examining the extent of state regulation of delegate
selection and by considering whether delegate selection is a state or
public function.
I. State Action Through Government Regulation of Delegate Selection. To the extent that activities which would otherwise be characterized as private are pursued in accordance with a state regulatory statute
so that legal consequences are attributed to these activities, state action
is involved.3 ' In those states whose statutes prescribe the organizational
structure of the party within the state, the powers and duties of different party assemblies, the composition of the state executive committee
and convention, the time and place for committee and convention
meetings, the terms of office of party officials, the selection of national
convention delegates, and the reporting of party finances, 32 a finding
of state action would be justified. At the other extreme are states which
29 Id. at 374.
30 Among these are the lack of "judicially discoverable and manageable standards," inappropriateness of the relief sought, and the possibility that one man, one vote requirements had in fact been satisfied by allowing full and equal participation at the level of
precinct meetings. See Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, 287 F. Supp. 794, 803-7
(D. Minn.), aff'd per curiam, 399 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1968). Smith v. State Executive Comm.,
288 F. Supp. 371, 376 (N.D. Ga. 1968), points to a complete lack of authority for assuming
jurisdiction over the internal affairs of a political party.
31 "Conduct that is formally 'private' may become so entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon state action." Evans v. Newton, 382 US. 296, 299 (1966).
When state statutes are followed by the parties, "legal consequence is given to the activities
of private parties ...." Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 10, at
1072.
32 See, e.g., ARmz. RFv.STAT. ANN. §§ 16-201 to 16-239 (1956); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 34-601
to 34-649 (1949); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 29-2901 to 29-2903, 29-3701 to 29-3705 (1969); KAN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 25-221, 25-223 (Supp. 1969).
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attempt no regulation of political parties. 83 In these states, state action
through state regulation is not present. Several other states lie between
the two extremes. 34 The search for state action in government regulation of the parties thus becomes essentially a factual inquiry, the
results of which will vary from state to state.
2. State Action in the Allocation of Delegates. At the second level
of the delegate selection process-the allocation of delegates to the
state parties by the national party-it may be more difficult to find
state action through government regulation. The national convention,
ungoverned by state or federal statutes, determines rules for such allocation. These rules0 5 are not keyed to the number of party members
per state.3 6 Since the national parties have remained virtually free of
direct state or federal regulation, state action on the part of the national
conventions would have to be based on an imputation of state action
of the several state parties to the deliberations of national party organs.Y' The national party is not, however, simply an agent of the
state parties. The national party organs exercise powers that no state
or state party possesses: they issue the call for a convention, hear and
decide credentials contests, determine rules of procedure, select temporary officers, and elect national officers. The allocation of delegates is
itself a power of the national party which no state party could exercise.
In performing these functions, the national party is not subject to
even indirect state statutory regulation.
3. State Action Through Performance of a "Governmental Function." An alternative approach to a finding of state action would be to
determine that nomination of a presidential candidate is a function
"governmental in nature."3 8 The historical evidence on this score is
inconclusive.3 9 However, both precedent and analysis strongly suggest
33 This is the situation for example in Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, and Kentucky.
34 Cf. AR. STAT. ANN. §§ 3201 to 3-319 (1956); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 9-372 to 9-461

(1958); MINN. STAT. §§ 202-20 to 202-27 (1962).
35 See rules mentioned note 6 supra; A. BEcan., Tim NEw AGE OF POLrICAL RFOt
37-39 (1968).
36 This is assuming that the basis for determining who shall have an equal vote in
delegate selection will be the number of registered party members in the state. On problems of determining what basis to use for insuring equal voting power see text infra, at
notes 83-91.
37 See Note, Regulation of Political Parties: Vote Dilution in the PresidentialNomination Procedure,54 IowA L. RFv. 471, 477 (1968).
38 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
39 See M. JENSEN, THE MAKING OF Tim AMERmcAN CONSrTON 111-4 (1964). Jensen
notes that it was a common assumption among the Constitution's draftsmen that, after
the first election which Washington was sure of winning, the Electoral College would
seldom cast a majority vote for any one man, and that the election would then be decided
in the House of Representatives. In such a situation, the role of the Electoral College
would essentially be one of nominating candidates. From this historical setting, one com-
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that nomination of presidential candidates is a governmental rather
than a private function. Since conduct of elections is clearly a state
function 0 and nominations are an integral part of the electoral process,
one might argue that the organizations which nominate candidates are
performing a state function. This "integral relation" argument has
been successful in the White Primary Cases41 and in Gray v. Sanders.42
The relation between the primary and election was especially "integral"
in these cases because the primaries involved state offices and predetermined the outcome of the general election. 43 In delegate selection,
however, no state office is immediately involved,4 and there is no predetermination of the election victor.
Another aspect of nomination that makes it appear to be more like
a private function than a governmental function is that the process of
nomination is generally carried on by individuals in their role as
private citizens. When a citizen, unaffiliated with a party or organized
group, puts himself up for political office, it would be difficult to find
state action in his candidacy. That the function of nomination is not
readily taken out of the hands of private citizens is illustrated by the
situation in one-party states that have imposed primary elections on the
nomination process; there is in these states the formation of competing
groups--party factions5-which organize to appeal to primary voters.
Thus, a campaign battle between nomination contenders is fought before the state imposed structures come into play. Imposition of state
structures on nomination does not end the private role of individuals
in nominating candidates; it merely pushes the role of private action
40
back a step.
mentator argues that the states, because they are given the power to choose electors, were
meant to control the nomination of presidential candidates. Since nomination of electors

is universally delegated by the states to the parties, this argument concludes that the parties are performing a state function. Note, Regulation of Political Parties: Vote Dilution
in the PresidentialNomination Procedure, 54 IowA L. Rv. 471, 472-3 (1968). This argument would be more plausible if selection, rather than nomination of electors had been
delegated to the parties. Also, it ignores the development by the parties of a completely
separate device for nominating candidates long before nomination of electors was delegated to the parties.
40 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
41 Cases dted note 16 supra.
42 372 U.S. 368 (1963). See also Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 285-6 (1921)
(concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Pitney).
43 See discussion note 18 supra.
44 Cases cited note 55 infra.
45 V. 0. Key hints that the same breakdown can occur in two party states: "Wide-open
primaries tend both to shatter party organization and to leave it without much of anything to do." V.0. KEY, AmE1UCAN STATE PoLrcs: AN INTRODUCTON 288 (1956).
46 A basic description of the operation of factionalized party systems is found in F.
GREENSTEIN, TnE AMERICAN PARTY Syse AND TE AMERICAN PEOPLE 60-68 (1963).
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Yet, the presidential nomination system does effectively narrow the
electoral choice to two. The state acquiesces in and gives legal effect to
this narrowing process by placing the candidate's name on the ballot.
In so doing, the state adopts party processes as part of its electoral
scheme. This phenomenon is clearest in one-party states where nomination is tantamount to election so that the general election is rendered
meaningless. The effect is not as aggravated in presidential elections,
but the actions of the major parties in choosing candidates severely
limit the element of choice in the general election; 47 it is certainly
arguable that this narrowing process bears an "integral" enough relation to the general election so as to constitute state action.
4. The "Governmental Official" Limitation on One Man, One Vote.
Because state involvement in general elections is undenied, there has
been little discussion of state action in the reapportionment cases. A
related inquiry results, however, from the Supreme Court's reluctance
to extend the one man, one vote principle beyond the popular election
of governmental officials. 48 The governmental duties performed by the
official need not be broad. In Hadley v. Junior College District,49 the
Court rejected examination of the functions performed by an official
as a test for deciding whether to apply the one man, one vote standard.50
Instead, it would apply equal protection principles to any popular
election of a government official. 51 But the Court equivocated: "It is of
course possible that there might be some case in which a State elects
certain functionaries whose duties are so far removed from normal governmental activities . . . that a popular election in compliance with
Reynolds [v. Sims] ... might not be required ... -"52 It would appear,

therefore, that while the boundaries of one man, one vote are not yet
precisely defined, there is a minimal requirement that activities with
some governmental character be involved.
One essential element of governmental activity-the ability to resort
to coercion to enforce governmental objectives-is absent with regard
to national conventions. Party members cannot be forced to follow the
47 This sort of reasoning is akin to the "structural" type of analysis described in C. BLAcK,
Sua'ruRE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTrruTIONAL LAW (1969). It leaves open the possibility

that operation of minor parties (e.g., the Socialist Party or Wallace's American Independent
Party) would not involve a governmental function and thus not be state action.
48 See, e.g., Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 109-10 (1967); In re Sullivan, 283
Ala. 514, 522, 219 So. 2d 346, 352 (1969); Sullivan v. Alabama State Bar, 295 F. Supp. 1216,
1222 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd per curiam, 394 U.S. 812 (1969); cf. Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231

(1966).
49 90 S. Ct. 791 (1970).
50 Id.
51
52

Id.
Id.

at 795.
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convention's dictates. In the tightly competitive system generally characteristic of presidential election politics, a party member can switch
his support to the opposing party and still have a substantial chance of
backing the successful candidate. Further, he is not necessarily locked
into a choice between two parties. 53 Though a third party candidate
has slight chance of winning the presidency, a strong third party organization can often force the major parties to adopt some of its policy
views.54
It would be a distortion of common understanding to call delegates
state or governmental officials. Both the Smith and Irish courts held
that delegates are not state officers.5 5 Delegates are involved in an endeavor to gain or retain political power rather than in an exercise of
political power through control of governmental activities and performance of governmental duties.
B.

The Political Question Doctrine
The political question limitation on judicial intervention, said to
involve the "justiciability" of a controversy, 5 has been severely narrowed since Baker v. Carr.5 7 Baker explains that a "political question"
can arise only when, as a minimum requirement,58 a controversy
deals with "the relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate
branches of the Federal Government."5
It is doubtful that in reviewing delegate selection procedures the
judiciary would be infringing on the exclusive sphere of either the
Executive or Congress. 0 Nevertheless, lower federal courts have refused to consider challenges to apportionment in delegate selection on
the grounds that it involved a "political question." 61 In these cases, the
53 The Supreme Court has recently facilitated third party access to the ballot. See
Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
54 A. BICKEL, supra note 35, at 42-43.
55 Smith v. State Executive Comm., 288 F. Supp. 371, 374 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Irish v.
Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, 287 F. Supp. 794, 797 (D. Minn.), afJ'd per curiam, 399
F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1968).
56 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-37 (1962).
57 See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23
(1968).
58 If this requirement of the political question doctrine is met, the court also considers
"'the appropriateness under our system of government of attributing finality to the action
of the political departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination.'" 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
59 Id.
60 Neither Congress nor the Executive presently supervises delegate selection procedures,
though there may be no constitutional bar to Congress doing so. Cf. Claude, Nationalization of the Electoral Process, 6 HARV. J. LEGIs. 139 (1969).
61 Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, 287 F. Supp. 794 (D. Minn. 1968), aff'd, 399
F.2d 119, 121 (8th Cir. 1968); cf. Smith v. State Executive Comm., 288 F. Supp. 371 (ND.
Ga. 1968).
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political question doctrine may be an inappropriate label for an appropriate consideration. What these courts were concerned with was not
a political question but rather the "lack of judicially manageable standards" for judicial decision, which Baker pointed to as one of the
characteristic features of a political question. 2 For example, if the
court had decided the controversy in Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor
Party,6 3 it would have determined whether Humphrey delegates should
be replaced by McCarthy delegates.6 4 In Smith v. State Executive Committee, 5 the court would have determined that a slate of delegates
already chosen could not be seated at the national convention. There
were no clear standards for choosing between the competing groups;
and since the Democratic Convention was imminent at the time both
of these suits were decided,6 6 the courts were understandably reluctant
to make a decision that might affect the outcome of the convention
7
deliberations.6
Moreover, the courts were justified on precedential grounds in refusing to consider the controversies, since judicial interference in intraparty affairs has not gone beyond cases of racial discrimination or cases
where the party selection predetermined the election. 68 As the Smith
court noted, "there is no known case to the effect that any jurisdiction
exists over the internal rules or management of a political party." 69
It has nevertheless been argued that had the complaints in Irish and
62 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
63 899 F.2d 119 (8th Cir.), aff'g 287 F. Supp. 794 (D. Minn. 1968).

64 See report of the Minnesota credentials dispute in CoNe. QuAR. SERVICE, THE PaRsiDENT AL NOmINATING CONVENTIONS

1968, at 102-3 (1968).

65 288 F. Supp. 371 (ND. Ga. 1968).
66 The Democratic National Convention began on Aug. 26, 1968. Irish was decided by
the Court of Appeals Aug. 13, 1968, and Smith was decided Aug. 23, 1968.
67 The Irish court also considered the availability of intraparty grievance structures as
a justification for refusing to grant relief. 399 F.2d 119, 121 (8th Cir. 1968).
68 The only Supreme Court case dealing directly with interference in the affairs of
political parties is Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952). The Court refused to invalidate a
requirement that candidates for presidential elector take a pledge to support their party's
presidential nominee. Said the Court, "The fact that the primary is a part of the election
machinery is immaterial unless the requirement violates some constitutional or statutory
provision." Id. at 227. This is the ground on which the case was distinguished from
the White Primary Cases, note 16 supra.
The majority rule in state courts appears to be that expressed in Democratic-FarmerLabor Party State Cent. Comm. v. Holm, 227 Minn. 52, 55, 33 N.W.2d 831, 833 (1948):
"[rjn factional controversies within a political party, where there is involved no controlling statute or clear right based on statute law, the courts will not assume jurisdiction,
but will leave the matter for determination within the party organization." See also Smith
v. McQueen, 232 Ala. 90, 166 So. 788 (1936); State ex rel. Robinett v. Jarrett, 200 Okla.
387, 196 P.2d 849 (1948); Tuck v. Cotton, 175 Ark. 409, 299 S.W. 613 (1927); Lasseigne v.
Martin, 202 So. 2d 250 (Ct. App. La. 1967); Carter v. Tomlinson, 149 Tex. 7, 227 S.V.2d
795 (1950). But see State ex rel. Buttz v. Marion Cir. Ct., 225 Ind. 7, 72 N.E.2d 225 (1947).
69 288 F.2d at 876.
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Smith been more timely-brought before any delegates had actually
been selected-judicial relief would have been appropriate 70 But the
consideration which gave the courts pause in Irish and Smith is not
absent before delegates are chosen. Any decision concerning delegate
selection would have two sets of impacts. First, it would affect the
immediate balance of power between competing party factions. Secondly, and more importantly, a judicial decision to impose one man,
one vote standards on parties could effect changes in the operation of
the political system itself . 1 Judicially manageable standards for dealing
with either of these impacts have not yet been developed.
II.

APPLICATION OF THE ONE MAN, ONE VOTE PRINCIPLE TO
DELEGATE SELECTION

Two elements of one man, one vote doctrine generate unique problems in applying the doctrine to delegate selection. The first is the
demand for perfect mathematical equality of voting power; the second
is that the one man, one vote doctrine developed to deal with governmental bodies. This section examines the effects of applying a doctrine
with these two qualities to selection of national convention delegates.
A.

"Legitimate Party Interests" in Unequal Apportionment of Delegates

The reapportionment cases suggested that there are legitimate state
interests which might justify slight72 deviations from mathematical
equality.73 The range of countervailing interests in legislative reapportionment situations is limited.7 4 Whether these same interests are
legitimate as applied to political parties has not been passed upon by
any court. But party activities, unlike normal governmental activities,
are commonly directed toward the promotion of an identifiable set of
70 Schmidt & Whalen, Credentials Contests at the 1968-And 1972-Democratic National
Conventions, 82 H~Av. L. RE v. 1438, 1449 n.46 (1969).
71 What the effects of imposing one man, one vote strictures on the parties and nomination process are likely to be is considered in Part InI infra.
72 The leeway is not broad. In Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969), the Court
found no "legally acceptable justification" for a variance as small as 3.13 per cent from
arithmetic equality.
73 Id. at 532. The Court reiterated its statement in Swann v. Adams, 385 US. 440, 443-4
(1967), that a state has the burden "to present ... acceptable reasons for the variations
among the populations of the various ... districts ....
" Id.
74 Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US. 553, 622-3 (1964), specifies
the interests to which the Court will give no quarter: history; economic or other group
interests; area; geographical considerations; a desire to insure effective representation for
sparsely settled areas; availability of access of citizens to their representatives; theories of
bicameralism; occupation; attempt to balance urban and rural power; and the preference
of a majority of voters in the state.
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policy preferences. It is to foster its particular goals that each party
seeks to win political office. Thus, the role of the political parties in
striving to win elections is qualitatively different from that of a legislature. The interests a party can assert in unequal apportionment should
be viewed in light of this difference in function.
In the weighting of convention votes by area, the political parties
have two peculiar interests which no state or local governmental agency
could justifiably assert. First, because of the differentiation between
states in the electoral college 75 and the desire to nominate a presidential
candidate with nationwide support, the parties seek to foster strong
state party organizations. At present this is done by the allocation of
"bonus votes" to state parties which carried their state in the previous
presidential, gubernatorial, or senatorial election. 8 Although the
bonus vote system used at present might be attacked as excessive, 77 the
courts should recognize a reasonable reward or incentive interest as
one bearing directly on the role of parties in actively striving to win
8
the highest public office."
Secondly, the national parties have a vital interest in assuring full
participation in the national convention by each state party. In the
campaign that follows the convention, the national strategy makers rely
on the state parties as important coordinating links between local and
national campaign efforts. If each state party does not participate in
the convention, it is unlikely to join in the campaign. The national
parties seek to promote this interest in full participation by guaranteeing a minimum number of delegates to each state.79 Such allocation
distorts equality of voting power among party members,8 0 but it serves
an important function in the party's organization. The national parties
remain essentially decentralized organizations which come to life only
75 See Banzhaf, One Man, 3312 Votes: A Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral College, 13 VILL. L. REV. 304 (1968).
70 At the 1968 Democratic National Convention, each state that cast its electoral votes
for the Democratic nominees for President and Vice-President in 1964 received ten bonus
votes. An additional bonus vote was allowed for each 100,000 votes cast in the state for the
1964 Democratic presidential candidate. The Republicans allowed six bonus votes if a
state went Republican in 1964 or if a Republican senator or governor was elected in the
state between 1964 and 1968.
77 See P. DAVID, R. GOLDMAN & R. BAIN, THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL PARTY CONVENTIONS
179-80 (K. Sproul ed. 1964); A. BICKEL, supra note 35, at 87-39.
78 See P. DAvID et al., supra note 77, at 179-80.
79 The Republicans allocate four delegates at large to each state with two additional
delegates for each representative in Congress. U.S. CONG. SEN. LIBRARY, NOMINATION AND
ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE UNrED STATES 56 (1968). The
Democrats allow three votes for each of the state's electors in the Electoral College. Id.
at 46.
80 See discussion note 89 infra.
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every four years. 8 ' One study notes: "The president, more than any
other national official, might seem to be elected by national plebiscite;
but even he owes his office to having won a series of contests in state
constituencies. . . . [T]here is perhaps no point on which writers on
American politics are so generally agreed as that our state and local
party organizations, taken collectively, are far more powerful than our
national party organizations. 8s 2 The guarantee of a minimum role in

the convention is a formal device to help insure that these local organizations will participate fully in nominating a candidate and in the following national effort to elect the party nominee.
B.

Problems of Defining Party Membership: Delineating the Constituency

Application of the one man, one vote doctrine to delegate selection
presents a problem not encountered by the courts in the reapportionment cases. The slogan "one party member, one vote" has little meaning
83
until "party member" is defined.
This problem has particular relevance in regard to the allocation
of convention votes by the national party.8 4 There are several possible
bases for the allocation of votes. One suggested basis is party registration: 5 each state would get a number of votes in the same proportion
to the total votes as the number of registered party members in the
state bears to the total number of registered party members. An initial
problem with this standard is that not all state parties maintain registration lists, and many lists are outdated. But assuming that a court
could order the compilation and maintenance of registration lists, this
would appear at first blush to be an attractive standard. Simple analogy
81 S. BAILEY, THE CONDITION OF OUR NATIONAL POLITICAL PARTIES 4 (1959); Comm. on
Political Parties, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System, 44 AM. POL. SCL REV. V
(Supp. Sept. 1950); Pennock, Responsiveness, Responsibility, and Majority Rule, 46 AM.
POL. Sci. RFv. 790, 801 (1952).
82 A. RANNEY & W. KENDALL, DEMsOCRACY AND THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTM 160 (1956).
83 "What that constituency [of each party] is, however, whether it is in any sense the
masses of party adherents or merely the professional party cadre, is gravely in question."
A. BICKCEL, supra note 35, at 21. See also E. SCHATTScHNEmER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 53-61'
(1942); Ranney, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Commentary, 45 Am.
POL. Sci. REv. 488 (1951).
84 The member problem also has significance as to the organization of the state parties,
where representation in state committees and conventions is not at present based on a
one man, one vote standard. Although provision is generally made at some lower level
(usually the precinct) for equal participation of all registered party members, the problems of defining membership for purposes of governance of the state party are the same
as those outlined in the text with respect to allocation of convention votes.
85 Cf. SCHMIDT & WHALEN, supra note 70, at 1460 n.92. This was apparently the basis
contemplated in Lynch v. Torquato, 343 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1964), and Rogers v. State
Comm. of the Republican Party, 96 N.J. Super. 265 (1967).
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to the population basis for legislative apportionment by states would
identify registered party members as the "citizens" of the party. The
analogy, however, breaks down. Unlike citizens of the national polity,
registered party members have no duties or obligations toward the party.
"Citizenship" in the party is not fixed-one can change party membership at will. And even from those who do not change their registration,
the party can neither demand nor expect loyalty at the polls. Only in
the loosest sense can the party be understood as the creature and representative of the totality of registered party members.
More realistically, it is those who actively participate in party affairs
who shape its policies and guide the success of its endeavors. Only if
the typical registered party member subscribes to those policies and
approves of its chosen candidate will he proclaim his identification
with the party, and then only passively.8 6 Professor Schattschneider
likens these identifiers to fans at a sporting contest.8 7 Defining the
point at which an enthusiastic fan becomes a participant (that is,
a party activist) poses a further difficult question which would involve
weighing the participation of a local ward heeler against that of a
8
national committeeman.
Another possible standard which would be easy to apply looks to
the number of votes cast for the party candidate in the previous presidential election.5 9 Each state would receive a number of convention
86 Public participation in party activity is low. See generally F. GRmENSTUN, supra note
46, at 10-16; Woodward & Roper, Political Activity of American Citizens, 44 Am. P oL.
Sca. REv. 872 (1950). In the sample used by Woodward & Roper, only 75 per cent said
they had voted "once or more in the last four years" and 31 per cent when asked, "Do4
you happen to belong to any organization that sometimes takes a stand on housing, better
government, school problems, or other public issues?" answered affirmatively. Id. at 8734.
87 E. ScHrArrscONrmR, supra note 83, at 55-56.
88 Even a standard as weak as occasional attendance at party meetings or functions
would probably exclude large numbers of ostensible party members.
89 This was suggested as a basis in ScimmT & WAIEN, supra note 70, at 1460 n.92.
Only after a determination of the basis from which convention votes are to be allotted
can one examine mathematically the degree of malapportionment in the allocation of
votes. Assuming that the number of votes cast for the party nominee in a state in the
previous election is accepted as a basis and is designated "S"; that "N" is the total votes
cast in the nation for the party nominee; that "X" is the number of votes allocated the
state party for the convention; and that "T" is the total number of convention votes: a
perfect apportionment scheme would have S/N = X/T for every state. If this basis were
imposed on the delegate selection process, the national party in allocating votes for the
next convention would merely plug in values for S, N, and T and solve the equation
for X.
If this computation had been used for the 1964 Republican National Convention, for
example, New York with 10.1% of the Republican voters in the 1960 presidential election
would have had the same percentage of convention votes. In actuality New York controlled 7.04% of the 1964 convention vote. A complete analysis reveals the small state bias
one would expect from the guarantee of a minimum number of votes to each state party.
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votes proportionate to the number of votes cast in that state for the
party candidate four years earlier. But this too can be a misleading
guide to party strength or to the number of usually loyal party members in the state. Basing the 1968 Republican convention vote on the
1964 Republican vote for President would have significantly misrepresented Republican strength in 1968.90 There would have been a corresponding misrepresentation for the Democrats.
Of the other possible measures of party membership-the number of
votes cast for the party in a previous senatorial or gubernatorial election, the population of voting age of the state, or the population of
the state---similar criticisms could be made. In the reapportionment
cases, the basis for determining equal representation was relatively
clear: all those who are governed by the elected official. No such clear
standard exists in dealing with political parties. The decision as to whom
a political party represents and seeks to provide for in its allocation of
votes would be much better made by the party itself.
III.

ONE MAN,

ONE VOTE AND THE RESPONSIBLE PARTY

Applying the one man, one vote principle to selection of delegates
to national nominating conventions would take the courts beyond the
present bounds of the reapportionment cases. It is argued that such an
extension of present doctrine is required to guarantee to each citizen
equal participation in the nomination process so that he can "effectively" cast his vote for the President. Nevertheless, it is probable that
extension of one man, one vote into this area would have other results
Twenty-five states were, by this computation, clearly overrepresented in the 1964 Republican convention. All of these states (except Texas) were in the lower two-thirds of the
states, listed in order of the number of 1960 Republican voters. Though eight states (New
York, California, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, Michigan, New Jersey, Indiana) cast 52.4%

of the 1960 Republican vote for president, they controlled 36.6% of the 1964 convention
votes. The Democrats had a similar record; their eight largest states cast 54.1% of the
1960 Democratic vote but controlled 40% of the 1964 convention votes. The figures are
based on the author's data on file with the University of Chicago Law Review.
In reading these figures, one must keep in mind that they depend on a basis which is
of questionable value, as is noted in the text immediately following this note. Also some
degree of inequality between S/N and X/T is unavoidable unless fractional votes are
allowed. The acceptance of any further degree of inequality would depend on whether
the court accepted the party's interests-outlined in the text supra at notes 72-82-in
unequal apportionment.
90 The 1968 Republican delegates would have represented more heavily the areas from
which Senator Goldwater won most of his meager support in 1964. This proposed allocation basis might have made it considerably more difficult for a moderate candidate to
make headway in 1968.
91 This was apparently the basis urged in Gallant v. LaFrance, 101 R.I. 299, 222 A.2d
567 (1966).
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that may outweigh and, in some cases, directly frustrate effective voter
participation in presidential elections.
A. Intraparty Democracy
If the evil associated with inequalities in delegate selection power is
a lack of responsiveness to the wishes of its members, it is difficult to
see how the present one man, one vote doctrine can remedy this deficiency without impairing other important objectives of the national
conventions. The chief criticism of the one man, one vote standard
in this context is that it confuses the nomination function with the
electoral function.92 The element of formalized popular control, how-

ever desirable or imperative it may be in the final choice of a President,9 3 is inapposite to the processes of sorting and simplifying voter
alternatives and of unifying dissident members that an American political party performs through its nominating procedures.M More concretely, imposition of one man, one vote standards is likely to reinforce
public expectations that the conventions be registering, rather than
deliberative, bodies; that a convention delegate should merely vote according to the mandate of those who choose him. This is what happened, and properly so, to the electoral college upon the introduction
of public participation in the selection of electors. But a similar impact
on party conventions would seriously impair performance of the two
vital functions of simplification and unification 5 and could seriously
disrupt the national two party system as we know it.
1. Sorting and Simplifying Function. One major task of the nominating conventions is to pick from a number of would-be candidates
92 "I']he essential characteristics of the nominating process differ in many important
respects from those of the election choice between major-party nominees." P. DAVm, et al.,
supra note 77, at 333.
93 See generally N. PFIEcE, THE PEoPLE's PRESIDENT (1968) which argues strongly for
abolition of the Electoral College and advocates direct election of the President and VicePresident; Banzhaf, One Man, 3312 Votes: A Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral College, 13 VMt. L. REv. 304 (1968).
94 Concerning the functions of political parties in the nominating process, see generally P. DAVID, et al., supra note 77.
95 "F]or the convention to be capable of achieving its broad objective of developing
a party consensus on a candidate, delegations must possess a range of discretion." V.O.
KEy, PoLrrics, PARTIES, AND PREssuRF GRoups 412 (5th ed. 1964). "[Tjhe convention must
be a deliberative, not a registering institution." A. BicmL, supra note 35, at 27.

The deliberative role of delegates from California, Massachusetts, and Oregon is

preempted by statute and the delegates are bound to support the primary winner, at
least on the first ballot. CAL. ELECTIONS CODE §§ 6057, 6058; MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
53, § 701 (Supp. 1969); ORE. Rrv.

STAT.

§§ 249.031(3), 249.221(2) (1969).

For a suggestion that the conventions have already lost their deliberative roles, see
Carleton, The Revolution in the PresidentialNominating Convention, 72 POL. Sa. QUAR.
224 (1957).
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one who will receive the party endorsement and who thus will compete
on relatively equal terms with the nominee of the other party.9 6 A
candidate must satisfy two criteria: he must be able to win, and he must
be able to do the job the office requires. As to the former, popular
appeal is a significant factor. Popularization of delegate selection would
inject this factor into the selection of a presidential candidate. This
public appeal factor is presently measured by polls and by the few
state primary elections that precede every convention, and these indicators are carefully considered by party leaders and convention delegates as they choose a presidential nominee. 98
Against this popular appeal factor is placed the more important requirement that the party candidate, if elected, be able to perform well
the chores of the presidency. Elitists would sense a danger of decreasing
emphasis on competency in any democratization of the nomination
procedures. Such mistrust of "the People" is not readily accepted today.99 However, the information cost to each voter of evaluating the
relative competence of a large number of potential candidates,
in light of the non-political demands on his time, might be so
high that their individual judgments as to a candidate's competence
would be hasty and ill considered. Even at present, when the choice
must be made between only two presidential candidates, general knowledge of candidates and issues is low. 10
Our political system compensates for this high information cost by
leaving to the political parties the task of sorting through the number
of possible candidates to find two who will be competent presidents,
thus simplifying for the voter the electoral decision. Convention delegates and party leaders under the current arrangement "are quite concerned about selecting suitable officeholders since it is assumed that
the actions and identities of these men will in the long run marginally
determine the extent and location of the party's appeal within the
electorate, and its record of success at the polls."1'0 The party activists
scrupulously take account of competence because it affects their stake
10 2
in the future of the party.
96 P. DAvm, et al., supra note 77, at 321-2.
Id. at 322.
See V.0. KEY, Poixrcs, PARTIES, AND PRESSuRE GROUPS 412 (5th ed. 1964); Carleton,
The Revolution in the PresidentialNominating Convention, 72 PoL. Sc. QuA. 224 (1957).
99 Cf. V.0. KFY, THE RESPONSIBLE Er.aoroRAT (1966).
100 See F. GREENSEIMN, supra note 46, at 5-17; note 86 supra.
97
98

101

N.

POLSBY & A. WLDAVSKY, PRSmENTIAL ELECiONS

21 (1964).

102 Contrary to the assertion of some observers-see Note, The PresidentialNomination:
Equal Protection at the Grass Roots, 42 S. CAL, L. REv. 169, 176 (1968)-that the
Republican nomination of Goldwater in 1964 resulted from a failure of party leaders to
heed rank and file sentiments, Professor John May of the University of Chicago asserts
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To impose popularization on the parties would mean that new
3
to the present parties-would be needed to define
groups°M-analogous
the competence and policy positions of competitors for the nomination
so that the mass of party members could intelligently choose their
candidate. Such proliferation of new groups is certainly unnecessary
to guarantee selection of competent candidates. 104 Even if these subgroups were formed, the actual nomination of the candidate by popularized means would tend to "throw nomination into the hands of those
whose stake in the workings of the political process is not great enough
to insure that the eventual nominee was qualified for the Presidency
by experience, qualities of mind, or by virtue of political alliances
with others professionally engaged in political activity."' 0 5
2. Unifying Function. Once a candidate is chosen, it is essential to
his success in campaigning for the presidency that he receive as full
a measure of support from within the party as possible. After bitter
nomination contests, it is often a difficult task to reconcile various
factions and unite them behind the party nominee. Any factor that
accentuates factional differences would seriously impede reunification.
Conceiving of the conventions as mere registering institutions is likely
to have just such an effect. A delegate who simply registers the will
of those who elected him will not be inclined to take it upon himself
to announce that he and the structural unit of the party he represents
(precinct, county, state) will use its resources wholeheartedly to support
the party nominee if that nominee is not the man he was directed to
back. After a close contest, the split between the two leading contenders
may be irreparable, for individual delegates on the losing side would
have no independent position from which to bargain and win concessions from the victor. Also, it would be clear to individual party m embers that their preference had been rejected by the group as a whole.
The early identification with one candidate may outweigh party identhat the nomination was the work not of party professionals, but of "passionate
amateurs who became delegates." Interview, Oct. 20, 1969. See also G. POMPER, NOMINATING
THE PRESIDENT 272 (1968), discussing the Goldwater nomination, who writes, "Voter
opinion was disregarded by delegates."
103 Such groups are commonly termed party factions. On the possible ill effects of
accentuation of party faction, see text infra at notes 106-14.
104 P. DAvm, et al., supra note 77, at 323. N. POLSBY & A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 101,
at 161, contends: "The nominee whose sole virtue is his innocuousness or pleasant smile
seems to have disappeared."
105 N. Por-sa & A. WiLDAvsKY, supra note 101, at 155, speaking of proposals for
expansion of direct presidential primaries. Viewing the desirability of popular control
of nominating conventions, P. DAvm, et al., supra note 77, at 333, senses a danger of
deemphasis of "such other virtues as stability, competence, foresight, and a gifted leadership "
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tification so that the disappointed individuals will either assume an
indifferent stance as to the remainder of the electoral process, or will
join with others to establish independent organizations for the promotion of the man who, despite their support, lost the major party
nomination.
This tendency to accentuate party factionalism is an often noted
consequence of making nomination a matter of popular selection. 10
This effect was indicated earlier with respect to the imposition of
primaries on state parties. 107 Such accentuation endangers the national
two party system itself. 08 If even one of the national parties developed
strong opposing factions, one of two consequences would follow. First,
since the factionalized party could not command its full manpower and
financial resources in support of one candidate, the presidential election might go to the unified party almost by default. 1 9 Or, if each
faction of the disunified party campaigned for its man or issue, thus
presenting more than two strong candidates to the electorate, the chance
that no nominee would win an electoral majority would significantly
increase." 0 Under present provisions, the electoral college, or failing
that, the House of Representatives,"' would then decide the election.
In a political system that values active competition between political
parties of equal strength 1 2 and election of a President by a majority
106 Ranney, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Commentary, 45 Amx.
POL. Sci. REv. 488, 491-2 (1951); cf. N. PoLsBsY & A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 101, at 154-5.
107 See text supra at notes 47-49.
108 The value of a national party system with only two major parties is not obvious
and perhaps for this reason easily underestimated. The primary incident of a two party
system is its contribution in mitigating divisive conflict within Congress and between the
branches of the federal government. See note 120 infra. An extensive defense of the
national two party system is beyond the scope of this comment, but it is interesting to
note that SCHATrsCHNEIDER, supra note 83, at 67, sees no need to argue the merits of
having a two party rather than a multiparty system, because a two party system is
"inevitable in the United States regardless of the personal preferences of individual
critics. We could not discard the two-party system and adopt a multiparty system in
the United States ... even if we wanted to do so."
109 Cf. the statement of V.0. KEY, POLnics, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS 346 (5th ed.
1964): "[]t may well be that intraparty democracy tends to encourage the development
of one-partyism and to make the politics of many states and cities, not a party politics,
but a politics of factions, cliques, and individuals with amorphous popular followings."
110 Though his opinion allowed a third party access to the ballot, Mr. Justice Black in
Rhodes v. Williams, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968), admitted: "Whe State does have an interest
in attempting to see that the election winner be the choice of a majority of the voters."
The third party plays an important role in our political system while not endangering
the desire for selection of a President by a majority vote. Cf. A. BICKEL, supra note 35,
at 42-50.
111 Each state casting one vote, clearly not in line with population variances. See U.S.
CONsT. amend. XII, superseding art. II, § 3.
112 See note 120 infra.
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vote,1 13 the scenario is not pleasant." 4 The danger of impairment of
the capacity to unify should prompt careful reconsideration of extension, through one man, one vote doctrine, of popular control of nominating processes.
B.

Responsiveness to the General Electorate

The present delegate selection processes are also said to obstruct responsiveness of the parties to the American electorate as a whole. 15
The main thrust of this charge is that the parties have failed to present
clear alternatives to the voters; the voters have no real choice. 116
The traditional proposal for improving the clarity of electoral alternatives and for enhancing the accountability of the parties to the electorate is for the parties to adopt a strict program or policy orientation
which is distinct from the platforms of other parties and to foster
disciplined adherence to this party platform." 7 The model for this sort
of party accountability is Britain's party system. 118 Proponents argue
that the electoral choice would be simplified by the adoption of such
a party system, with a correlative increase in the degree of popular
participation in the political process." 9
113 This value is based less on a belief that a man who wins a majority vote is more
capable of being President than on a notion that the President should be a representative
of all the people. Andrew Jackson was probably the first to use this notion to justify
expansion of presidential power. See A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
335-42 (1963).
114 Unless one believes that if the factions took distinct policy positions voter choices
would be easier. But see notes 116, 120 infra.
115 Note, Regulation of PoliticalParties: Vote Dilution in the PresidentialNomination
Procedure, 54 IowA L. REv. 471 (1968); Note, The Presidential Nomination: Equal
Protection at the Grass Roots, 42 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 169, 170 (1968).
116 The short answer is that there is a choice. There most probably was a substantive
difference in policy pursuits as a result of the selection of a Kennedy over a Nixon,
a Johnson over a Goldwater, or a Nixon over a Humphrey. Furthermore, national party
platforms show major differences. In 1968, the Democratic and Republican platforms
differed on Vietnam war policy and law and order issues. It can safely be said that the
Democrats were more hawkish as to Vietnam and more liberal on domestic policies than
were the Republicans. The attitude of "no choice" may well result not from lack of
substantive choice but from a failure of the parties to articulate the choice. Given the
goal of majority support to put a man in the Presidency and the multi-faceted nature of
our society, this non-articulation of party differences may be a structural necessity,
unremediable without drastic alteration of the whole party system. See note 120 infra.
117

See Comm. on Political Parties, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System,

44 Am. POL. 5cr. REv. (Supp. Sept. 1950) [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF THE ComM. ON
PoLrTicAL PARTIES]. This report sparked a lively discussion at the time. See authorities
cited note 120 infra. But since then, the issue has received little attention.
118 A. RANNEY & W. KENDALL, DEaocRAcY AND THE AMmCAN PARTY SYsTm 527-30
(1956).
119 See REPORT OF THE COMMa.

ON POLITICAL PARTIES 15.
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There is extensive criticism of reform along these lines. 20 Even if
policy orientation is accepted as a method of increasing responsiveness
to the general community, there remains a question of the utility of
intraparty democracy as a part of the reform. "[I]t is difficult to see
how the... notion of 'intraparty democracy' is calculated to promote
achievement of .. .the 'external' responsibility of the parties to the
whole community.' 1 Pursuit of intraparty democracy even in a
policy oriented party would be a failure to recognize "the possibilities
for promoting factionalism in the parties by trying to make them into
something other than purely private associations."'
120 The arguments over the desirability of a policy orientation and centralization of
political parties are somewhat complex. For purposes of clarity, the position as to reform along these lines from which this comment proceeds should be explained.
The political parties in the United States do not, and perhaps cannot, function as do
those in Britain. One party cannot clearly be labeled "conservative" and the other
"liberal." Because the desire to seek consensus, or majority, support is sought to be
fulfilled in a society with many distinct interest groups and many shades of opinion
on major issues, both parties seek a common ground in which a majority of voters will
coalesce. This is a common phenomenon in presidential elections; as election day draws
near, both major candidates modify their positions to bring them more in line with the
middle-of-the-road "swing" voters who often determine an election.
But neither the party nor its presidential candidate can depart too far from the positions
of those who provide the party's bedrock support. The views of the party faithful limit
deviation from those interests with which the party is associated; for the presidential
candidate, these limits operate during the election and, if he is elected, during his
administration. Thus, the choice of the American voter is generally between liberal
(Democratic Party) and conservative (Republican Party) tendencies. It is only the "center

of gravity" of each party that differs; but they do differ.
In the United States, this similarity of party positions promotes the stability of the
government itself. In Britain, if a party wins an election, it should be able to implement
its policy stands because it controls the body responsible for governmental policy
making. The British party can afford to take distinct policy stands. Having had control
of government policy, if the party is unsuccessful in implementing its goals, it is totally
accountable to the voters. Another party can be given control of the government. Neither
American party can so readily be held accountable to the electorate for the course of

governmental actions; this is one cost of the separation of powers concept on which the
federal government is based. Even in extreme periods of one-party dominance, both
parties retain and exercise some control over governmental affairs. If the business of
government is to go on without bitter and divisive strife within and between the branches
of government, the parties must agree on a broad range of values and goals.
A. RANNEY & W. KENDALL,supra note 118, at 527 n.15, lists these as the "leading general
defenses of our present party system": P. HmRNG, THE POLmcs OF DEmocRAcY (1940);
H. AGAR, THE PRICE OF UNION (1950); E. GRIFFrrH, CONGRESS: ITS CONTEMPORARY ROLE
(1951). For critical analysis of the REPORT OF HE Co 1M. ON PoLITIcAL PARTIES, see Ranney,
Toward A More Responsible Two-Party System: A Commentary, 45 AM. POL. Sc. REv.
488 (1951); Turner, Responsible Parties:A Dissent from the Floor, 45 Am. POL. Sci. REV.
143 (1951).
121 Ranney, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Commentary, 45 Am.
POL. Sci. RFv. 488, 491 (1951).
122 Id. at 491-2.
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The University of Chicago Law Review

A leading proponent of the policy orientation reform, Professor
Schattschneider, 12 3 summed up the objection to intraparty democracy
this way: 124
The parties do not need laws to make them sensitive to the
wishes of the voters any more than we need laws compelling
merchants to please their customers. The sovereignty of the
voter consists in his freedom of choice just as the sovereignty
of the consumer in the economic system consists in his freedom
to trade in a competitive market. That is enough; little can
be added to it by inventing an imaginary membership in a
fictitious party association. Democracy is not to be found in
the parties but between the parties.
CONCLUSION

The tradition of non-interference with political parties is a strong
one. A recognition of functional differences between the nomination
and election aspects of the presidential selection process should persuade the courts not to break this tradition. The one man, one vote
standard with its implication of mathematical precision would allow
the parties too little leeway in building, maintaining, and fostering a
nationwide coalition of interests that will work within the party organization to effectuate political goals by winning public office. As a method
of promoting intraparty democracy, application of one man, one vote
could be a step leading to drastic reshaping of the building blocks of
our political system. It is not at all clear that such judicial reshaping
is needed.
123 Schattschneider was chairman of the group which prepared the REPORT OF THE
CoMM. ON POLITICAL PARTIES.

124 E. Scs ATASCHNErME,

supra note 83, at 60.

